

## NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Lt. Gen. Kenji DOIHARA

Jap super-spy, agent-provocateur extraordinary, fifth-column expert and manufacturer of incidents, who figured so largely in Japan's annexation of Manchuria, and towards whom, according to some, the U.S. and Britain were blindly indulgent. For more than 10 years he bought and sold Chinese politicians and war lords in an effort to undermine Chiang's control and establish Japan's Empire in China. For his pains, he won the unofficial title of the "Lawrence of Manchuria." Later he became Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Air Force.

Doihara was early imbued with the ideas of Mitsuru TOYAMA (of Black Dragon Society fame) for a world-wide super-intelligence directed towards furthering Japan's aggressive, expansionist policy. Doihara is said once to have trudged throughout Korea disguised as a peddler furthering Toyama's doctrines.

Doihara concentrated on Chinese on Chinese affairs. He so mastered the Chinese language that, when donning Chinese clothes, the Chinese themselves could not tell he was a Jap. He learned Chinese etiquette, mannerisms and trickery, could discuss Chinese literature and art and sing Chinese songs. This only added to his fame, but as time went on, he became so widely known that he was unable to preserve his incognito or mingle as freely as before.

In the early 1930's, Doihara was middle-aged. Short and stocky, with a Hitler mustache, he was said to look like a good-natured, amiable person of Yaku-Secretary type or an oriental "horatio Alger". Blunt and good-natured, he had none of the mannerisms of the typical Jap spy of fiction. His specialty was information about people and it is said he had a detailed dossier on every American in Shanghai.

Doihara had been at one time "high adviser" to the old warlord ruler of Manchuria, Marshal Chang Tso-lin who was killed by a bomb thrown under his train. Suspicion points to Doihara as the engineer of the plot.

### EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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He is also said to have engineered the kidnapping of the Manchu boy Emperor Henry Pu-i and subsequently promoted him for the job of puppet ruler of Manchuria.

In 1931, the Commander in Chief of the Jap Kwangtung forces, General Loihara, made Colonel Doihara his chief intelligence officer for Szechuan. Their headquarters at Mukden was the nerve center of the Jap Army's Secret Service. Doihara then became Mayor of Mukden (some say for one week only) at the time of the Mukden Incident and was credited with planning this daring incident which resulted in the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops. By this time, Doihara's appearance in any locality invariably foreboded a fresh Jap plot.

In 1936, after more years of successful scheming, Doihara, now a Major General, was made Chief of the Special Services Section of the Jap Kwangtung Garrison, or, in effect, the Army overlord of what the Japs called the Manchurian leased Territory - actually as much a part of Japan as the city of Tokyo. The Army went into business on a huge scale, taking over direct management of many industries and state enterprises and Doihara waxed rich in his post in the Special Services Section which controlled most army business and which was considered by the Japs a guarantee of financial success.

It is said, however, that Doihara failed to realize his greatest ambition -- to separate the Five Northern Provinces from China and make them autonomous, i.e., under Jap control. His schemes were thwarted by the wily Chinese, and Tokyo in 1935-1936 was not yet ready for war. Doihara was finally repudiated by his government and his schemes for a Manchurian movement collapsed. He later said the whole thing was "only a newspaper myth."

As a face saver, he set up a puppet regime in East Hopei. This proved strategically valuable to Jap and useful as a vast narcotics and smuggling base.

from which operations were carried on southward under the direction and protection of Sohma's own Special Services section of the Jap. Army.

In the long years of his undercover political maneuverings, he kept the Press and public rigidly blind to his activities; but suddenly in 1936, he broke forth with Press statements that fairly cried of Jap.'s honeyed gospel and said that all they had in mind for China was peace, no violence and prosperity. He emphatically denied that Japan was anti-foreign or had any ideas whatsoever for an Asia soviet, for the Asiatics.

After the military mutiny in Tokyo in February 1936, Sohma was recalled to Tokyo and given command of a Division.

In 1937 at the start of the Indo-Japanese war, he went back to China in command of troop divisions. In 1938, his 24th Division was severely defeated in northern Manchuria when the Chiansse cut the Yellow River dike and drowned most of his soldiers. This culminated in the now famous Jap. defeat at the Battle of Taierzhuang in May 1938.

The suspicion now seemed to be confirmed that he was a better trickster than a fighting general.

He returned to Japan and from then on little was heard of his activities. Except that in May 1939, it was reported that he had arrived in the south to prevail upon Wang Ching-wei to head a coalition of Japanese puppet governments in China.

In 1942, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Air Forces.

In May 1943, it was announced that he was newly appointed as Commander of the Eastern Military Defense Zone, the defensive zone which centred around Tokyo, and concurrently a member of the Supreme War Council.

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An interesting comment on Boilerm is found in Melville Vesper's book Secret Agent of Japan, published about 1938. Vesper quotes the "Chief" of the Japanese Intelligence Service as saying that Boilerm worked under him for many years and that Boilerm was much less of a "treacherous" than he thought he was. Says this "Chief" of Jap Intelligence: "... he delights in showing his greatness by his flattering manner... no one can deny that he has done well in many of his undertakings but the fact remains that he has many failures to his discredit, so much so that one would imagine they form the mistakes of a single corporal rather than a Colonel in the Japanese Intelligence Service."

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